Cybersecurity

The technology that protects everything else

Security products sit at the most privileged points of an organisation's infrastructure. That makes the question of who controls them, and under which law, especially relevant.

Why security technology is a special case

Most software processes data. Security software is trusted to see and control almost everything. To do its job, it typically needs:

  • Deep privileges — endpoint agents at operating-system kernel level, identity systems that grant all access, PAM vaults holding administrator credentials, firewalls that can inspect and block all traffic.
  • A continuous update channel — signatures, detection content and software updates pushed by the vendor, often automatically.
  • Telemetry flowing outward — events, files and behavioural data sent to the vendor's cloud for analysis.
  • Vendor access — support engineers, managed detection services and licensing back-ends.

This is why it is reasonable to ask not only how good a security product is, but also who ultimately controls it.

An illustration that is not about nationality

On 19 July 2024, a faulty content update for a widely used endpoint security product caused around 8.5 million Windows devices to crash, according to Microsoft's estimate. Airlines, hospitals and banks were affected worldwide.1

The vendor was not malicious and the issue was quickly identified. But the incident showed how a single vendor's update channel can affect critical operations across many countries at once. Control over that channel is a strategic dependency, wherever the vendor is based.

How dependent should European organisations be on non-European suppliers for the technology that protects their most critical systems?

An important caveat

European cybersecurity products are not automatically more secure. Security depends on engineering quality, secure development practices, vulnerability handling, transparency and track record. The argument here is narrower: geographic, legal, technological and economic dependency are real risk factors and should be included in risk assessments, alongside technical quality.

Layers of dependency in a security product

“European” or “non-European” is too simple. A product can be European at one layer and dependent at another. Map each layer separately.

OwnershipWho owns the supplier and its parent — founders, listed shareholders, private equity, a state?
JurisdictionWhich country's laws apply to the parent company, including laws with extraterritorial reach?
DevelopmentWhere is the source code written, maintained and reviewed?
Update & signingWho operates the update servers and holds the code-signing keys?
Cloud back-endWhere is telemetry processed, and who operates the infrastructure?
LicensingDoes the product stop working if it cannot reach the licence server?
Support accessFrom which countries can support staff access your environment?
Hardware & componentsWhich chips, appliances and third-party libraries does it depend on?

Security technology areas and their sovereignty questions

Each area has its own dependency profile. Use the key question as a starting point for your evaluation, then check the European options.

Cybersecurity technology areas, what they control and the key sovereignty question for each
TechnologyWhat it controlsKey sovereignty question
SIEMCentral log and event data of the entire organisationWhere are logs stored and analysed, and can the platform run fully under your control?
SOC technologyDetection, triage and response workflowsCan your SOC keep operating if a vendor cloud or managed service becomes unavailable?
EDR / XDRKernel-level agents on every endpoint and serverWho controls the update channel and the remote-response functions?
FirewallsAll traffic between network zones and the internetDo updates, management and licensing depend on the vendor's cloud?
Network Detection & ResponseFull visibility of network trafficIs traffic metadata processed locally or sent to an external cloud?
OT securityVisibility and protection of industrial networksCan it run fully on-premises in a segmented or air-gapped network?
ICS monitoringPassive monitoring of industrial protocolsCan signatures and asset databases be updated offline?
PAMAdministrator credentials and privileged sessionsWho could, in theory, compel access to the vault or its key material?
Secure remote accessExternal access to internal and OT systemsDoes every connection route through the vendor's infrastructure?
Identity & Access ManagementWho can log in to everythingCan authentication continue if the identity cloud is unavailable or access is restricted?
Vulnerability managementKnowledge of all your weaknessesWhere is the list of your unpatched systems stored?
PKITrust anchors for devices, users and codeWho holds the root keys, and in which hardware?
EncryptionConfidentiality of data at rest and in transitWho controls the keys — you, or the service provider?
Email securityAll inbound and outbound mailWhere is mail content processed and quarantined?
Threat intelligenceSituational awareness and attributionWhose perspective and priorities shape the intelligence you receive?
Secure collaborationConfidential communication and documentsIs end-to-end encryption under your control, and where are servers operated?
Cloud securityConfiguration and workloads in the cloudDoes the tool add a second dependency on top of the cloud provider?
BackupYour last line of defence against ransomwareCan you restore without the vendor's cloud, licence server or support?
Incident response technologyForensics and containment during a crisisAre tools and retainers available when you need them, under suitable jurisdiction?

Four dependencies to add to your risk assessment

Risk frameworks already cover confidentiality, integrity and availability. Supplier dependency is often handled only through contracts. Make it explicit.

Geographic

Where are the people, data centres, update servers and support teams? Which of them sit outside Europe?

Legal

Which jurisdictions can compel the supplier to disclose data, suspend service or restrict exports?

Technological

Can you operate, update and restore without the supplier's cloud? Are formats and protocols open?

Economic

What happens if the supplier is acquired, changes its pricing, ends a product line or becomes insolvent?

Under the NIS2 Directive, essential and important entities must already address supply-chain security, including the security-related aspects of relationships with direct suppliers.2 Sovereignty considerations fit naturally into that existing obligation — but NIS2 does not require buying European. See regulation vs. choice.

OT & critical infrastructure

When technology dependency becomes a societal risk

In energy, water, telecom and transport, a supplier problem is not only a business problem. It can affect public safety and the functioning of society.

Energy & electricity

Grid control, substations, generation and distributed energy resources.

Gas

Transmission, compression, storage and metering systems.

Water

Drinking-water treatment, wastewater and flood control.

Telecom

Core networks, radio access and network management.

Transport

Rail signalling, traffic management, ports and aviation.

Government

Public administration, emergency services and defence-adjacent systems.

Industry

Manufacturing, chemicals and process industries.

OT, ICS & SCADA

The control systems that move physical processes — often in service for decades.

Why sovereignty is especially relevant here

  • Long lifecycles. OT systems often stay in service for 15 years or longer — far longer than the typical horizon of a vendor's strategy, ownership or pricing.
  • Physical consequences. Availability and safety come first. Losing access to updates or support can have consequences in the physical world.
  • Segmented networks. Many OT networks are, or should be, isolated. Products that require continuous cloud connectivity can conflict with that design.
  • Regulation. Operators in these sectors fall under NIS2 and, for designated critical entities, the Critical Entities Resilience (CER) Directive, which focus on resilience and continuity.23
  • Geopolitics. Export controls, sanctions and trade disputes can affect the availability of technology and updates — a scenario that should be planned for, however unlikely it seems today.

Stress-test scenarios

Run these scenarios against each critical supplier:

  • The vendor is acquired by a company from another jurisdiction.
  • A government restricts exports of the technology or its updates.
  • The vendor discontinues its on-premises version in favour of SaaS.
  • The vendor's cloud service is unavailable for a week.
  • The vendor's update channel is compromised.
  • The vendor becomes insolvent.

Twelve questions for OT and critical infrastructure suppliers

  1. Can the system operate without an external cloud service?
  2. Can security updates still be obtained during a geopolitical disruption?
  3. Who controls the update infrastructure?
  4. Where is the source code maintained?
  5. Can the product be operated fully on-premises?
  6. Does licensing require continuous internet connectivity?
  7. Where is telemetry processed?
  8. Can the organisation export all configuration and security data?
  9. Is there an alternative supplier?
  10. What happens if the vendor is acquired?
  11. What happens if a foreign government restricts technology exports?
  12. Which jurisdiction ultimately applies to the supplier?
Practical measures that work regardless of supplier origin

Prefer products that can run fully on-premises and offline; mirror updates internally and validate them before deployment; negotiate source-code escrow and long-term support commitments; require open, documented protocols and export formats; keep a qualified second supplier for the most critical functions; and follow the IEC 62443 series for industrial security.