Why Europe
Sovereignty is the ability to choose
Technological sovereignty is not about self-sufficiency or closing borders. It is about keeping real options: being able to decide, operate and change course without depending on decisions made elsewhere.
Four kinds of sovereignty — and why they are different
“Sovereignty” is often used as one word for four different things. A service can score well on one and poorly on another.
Data sovereignty
Who can access our data, and under which law?
Data is stored and processed in line with European law, and no foreign authority can compel access to it. Data location is part of this, but not all of it.
Technological sovereignty
Do we understand, control and can we replace the technology?
Europe has the capability to develop, maintain, audit and, if needed, replace critical technology. That covers source code, intellectual property, engineering skills and open standards.
Operational sovereignty
Can we keep running if the supplier cannot or will not help?
Operations, updates, support and administration can continue under your control, without depending on external cloud services or foreign personnel.
Economic sovereignty
Where do value, profits, jobs and capability accumulate?
A healthy European base of companies, investors and talent captures value from European demand and reinvests it in the next generation of technology.
Why “hosted in Europe” does not make a service sovereign
Many global providers now offer EU data regions, EU data boundaries and “sovereign cloud” products. These are real improvements for data location and compliance. But data location answers only one of four questions.
- Who operates the infrastructure? Data in a Frankfurt data centre can still be administered by a company whose parent is subject to another country's law.
- Which law applies to the parent? Some laws claim reach over data that a provider controls, regardless of where it is stored. The US CLOUD Act is the best-known example.1
- Who controls the software? Updates, features, pricing and end-of-life decisions are taken by the vendor.
- Can you leave? Without data portability and open standards, location does not give you freedom of choice.
Under the US CLOUD Act (2018), a provider subject to US jurisdiction must comply with US disclosure orders for data in its “possession, custody, or control, regardless of whether such communication, record, or other information is located within or outside of the United States”.1
On 10 June 2025, Microsoft France's director of public and legal affairs was asked under oath by a French Senate inquiry whether he could guarantee that French citizens' data would never be transmitted to US authorities following a US injunction without French consent. He answered: Non, je ne peux pas le garantir, mais, encore une fois, cela ne s'est encore jamais produit
(“No, I cannot guarantee it, but, once again, this has never happened yet”).2
For balance: EU law pushes back. Under the GDPR, third-country court orders to disclose personal data are only recognised if based on an international agreement,3 and the Data Act requires cloud providers to take measures against unlawful third-country access to non-personal data.4 Microsoft has also made contractual commitments to European governments to contest orders to suspend its European cloud operations.5 These measures reduce the risk, but they create a conflict of laws rather than legal immunity.
Four questions, four layers
Where is the data?
Data locationEU region, EU data centre
Who runs it?
OperationsOperator, administrators, support access
Who owns it?
ControlUltimate parent company and its shareholders
Whose law applies?
JurisdictionIncluding laws with extraterritorial effect
A service is only as sovereign as its least sovereign layer that matters for your risk.
Key concepts in plain language
Digital sovereignty
The ability of a society, organisation or person to act independently and by their own rules in the digital world.
Technological sovereignty
Having the capability to develop, operate and replace critical technologies, or to obtain them from several trustworthy sources.
Strategic autonomy
The capacity to act on your own priorities, while still choosing to cooperate with partners. It does not mean autarky.
Cybersecurity resilience
The ability to prevent, withstand and recover from cyber incidents, including incidents that start at a supplier.
Supply-chain resilience
Not depending on a single supplier, country or component for something you cannot do without.
Vendor dependency
The cost, risk and time needed to leave a supplier. It grows with proprietary formats, deep integration and unique skills.
Jurisdiction
Whose courts, laws and authorities can ultimately compel a company to act, or to stop acting.
Extraterritorial legislation
Laws that apply beyond a country's borders, for example to data held abroad by a company subject to that law, or to exports of technology.
Intellectual property
Ownership of code, patents and know-how. Whoever owns the IP decides on licensing, roadmap and access to source code.
Cloud dependency
Reliance on a cloud provider for infrastructure, platform services, identity or management, often in more ways than are visible.
Skills and knowledge
Engineering capability built by working on hard problems. Capability that is not used tends to move elsewhere.
European R&D
Research and development carried out in Europe, often funded by revenue from European customers.
Technology ecosystems
The network of companies, investors, universities, start-ups and specialists that reinforce each other.
Long-term strategic capability
What remains after a decade of decisions: the companies, skills and options a continent can actually draw on.
The European technology stack: strengths and gaps
An honest picture helps procurement focus where European options are realistic today, and where dependency will remain for now.
Editorial assessment of the availability of European options for typical enterprise use, based on the companies in our database and public information. This is not market-share data.
Business applications
Strong optionsEurope hosts some of the world's largest enterprise software vendors, for example in ERP.
Security tooling
Strong optionsMature European vendors exist for endpoint protection, firewalls, PAM, NDR, SIEM, encryption, OT security and vulnerability management.
Collaboration & email
Credible optionsMature open-source and commercial suites, including public-sector initiatives. Integration depth and user familiarity are the main hurdles.
Identity & access
Credible optionsEuropean IAM, PAM and authentication vendors exist. Deep integration with dominant office platforms makes switching harder.
Cloud infrastructure (IaaS)
Credible optionsMany European providers offer compute, storage, Kubernetes and object storage. The breadth of managed services is narrower than at the largest global providers.
Virtualisation & platforms
Credible optionsEuropean open-source virtualisation and Kubernetes platforms are in production use.
Hyperscale platform services
LimitedGlobal-scale PaaS, AI platforms and advanced managed services are concentrated among a few non-European providers.
Desktop & mobile operating systems
LimitedEuropean Linux distributions exist for servers and some desktops. Mainstream desktop and mobile platforms are not European.
Semiconductors & hardware
LimitedEurope has strengths in chipmaking equipment and specialised chips, but depends on others for leading-edge processors and most servers and devices.
Where the euro goes: five supplier profiles
A non-interactive summary of the €100 explorer. It is qualitative and illustrative. Real cases depend on the specific supplier.
| Supplier profile | Jobs & services | R&D & IP | Infrastructure | Profits & control |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| European vendor, European stack | Largely Europe | Largely Europe | Largely Europe | Largely Europe (shareholders may be anywhere) |
| European vendor on a non-European cloud | Largely Europe | European application, non-European platform | Mixed | Mixed: part of the revenue pays platform fees |
| European reseller of a non-European product | Largely Europe | Largely outside Europe | Depends on the deployment | Margin local, licence revenue and control with the vendor |
| Non-European vendor with large European operations | Largely Europe | Mixed: often some European R&D, IP held elsewhere | Mixed: EU data centres, control by the parent company | Largely outside Europe; tax depends on structure |
| Open source with a European partner | Largely Europe | Depends on the maintainers; open licence | Your choice | Service revenue local; no licence lock-in |
Evidence
What the evidence says
Selected, verifiable statements and events. We prefer primary sources and quote them, not paraphrase them, wherever possible.
The Commission: dependencies remain significant
“Dependencies on non-EU providers remain significant in cloud services, cybersecurity and other strategic technologies.”6
State of the Digital Decade 2026. The same publication cites a 2026 Special Eurobarometer: 85% support investment in EU-developed digital infrastructure and 82% favour reducing dependence on non-EU suppliers.
Draghi: cloud concentration
“Just three US ‘hyperscalers’ account for over 65% of the global as well as of the European cloud market. The largest European cloud operator accounts for just 2% of the EU market.”7
The Future of European Competitiveness, Part A, p. 24 (September 2024), citing third-party market data.
Draghi: an honest nuance
“It is too late for the EU to try and develop systematic challengers to the major US cloud providers … However, for reasons of European sovereignty, the EU should ensure that it has a competitive domestic industry that can meet the demand for ‘sovereign cloud’ solutions.”7
Part A, p. 34. On p. 24 the report adds that EU companies should “maintain a foothold in areas where technological sovereignty is required, such as security and encryption”.
NIS2 names dependency as a risk
NIS2 lists non-technical supply-chain risk factors “such as undue influence by a third country on suppliers and service providers” and “potential systemic supply disruptions, in particular in the case of technological lock-in or provider dependency”.8
Directive (EU) 2022/2555, recital 90.
Public administrations are acting
In April 2024, Schleswig-Holstein decided to make LibreOffice the standard office software for its state employees,9 and by October 2025 it had migrated over 40,000 mailboxes to open-source software. The minister acknowledged problems during the migration.10 In June 2025, Denmark's Ministry of Digitalisation announced it would start replacing Microsoft Office with LibreOffice.11 Germany (openDesk) and France (La Suite numérique) offer open-source workplace suites for public administrations.1213
A case that is still disputed
In May 2025, the Associated Press reported, citing ICC staffers, that after US sanctions against the International Criminal Court's prosecutor, Microsoft cancelled his email address.14 Microsoft denies this: “At no point did Microsoft cease or suspend its services to the ICC.”15 In October 2025, the ICC confirmed it is replacing Microsoft Office with openDesk, without giving a public reason.16
We include this case because it is widely cited. The facts remain contested, so it should not be presented as proof.
The European Commission has proposed further measures, including a revised Cybersecurity Act (January 2026),17 a Tech Sovereignty Package with a Cloud and AI Development Act (June 2026)18 and a Public Procurement Act with a European preference framework (September 2026).19 All three are proposals that the European Parliament and the Council still have to negotiate. See regulation vs. choice.
The trade-offs, openly
A credible argument for European technology has to acknowledge what it is up against.
US companies contribute in Europe
Non-European technology companies employ many people in Europe, run European data centres and R&D centres, and pay taxes here.
Supply chains are global
European companies use chips, components, libraries and sometimes cloud platforms from elsewhere. Full independence is not a realistic goal for anyone.
Ownership is international
European companies can have non-European investors, and they can be acquired. European ownership does not automatically mean technological independence.
European is not automatically more secure
Security depends on engineering, processes and track record, not on a flag.
Sometimes the alternative is not as good
In some categories, non-European products are technically superior or more complete. Pretending otherwise damages credibility.
Switching costs are real
Migration consumes budget, staff time and attention, and it introduces operational risk. Plan it where the strategic benefit justifies it.
Common arguments about European technology
Ten things people say in procurement meetings, with nuanced answers.
“European technology is always more expensive.”
Prices vary by category, by supplier and by deal. For some products, such as basic compute, storage or hosting, European list prices can be competitive. Other European products cost more. The relevant comparison is total cost of ownership: licences, egress fees, mandatory bundles, price increases after lock-in, and the cost of leaving. Compare real quotes for your own requirements.
“American technology is always technically superior.”
In some areas, such as hyperscale platform services and frontier AI, the largest US providers lead clearly. In others, including endpoint protection, encryption, firewalls, PAM and OT security, European vendors compete at a high level and regularly do well in independent tests and certifications. Evaluate each category on its own merits.
“There are no European alternatives.”
For most categories in security, hosting, collaboration and infrastructure, there are several European options. Our database lists more than a hundred. In a few areas, such as leading-edge chips, mainstream desktop and mobile operating systems and the broadest hyperscale platforms, options are genuinely limited. “No European alternative” should be a documented finding, not an assumption.
“Our data is hosted in Europe, therefore the service is European.”
Data location is only one layer. The operator, the parent company and the applicable jurisdiction matter just as much. See why EU hosting is not enough.
“The supplier has a European office, so it is a European supplier.”
A local subsidiary or sales office does not change who ultimately controls the company, where the IP sits or which law applies to the parent. Look at the ultimate parent and control.
“Open source automatically means digital sovereignty.”
Open source gives you the right to inspect, run and modify the code, and it reduces licence lock-in. But sovereignty also requires the capability to operate and maintain it, attention to who maintains the project, and a healthy community. Open-source software run as a service by a non-European provider may offer little operational sovereignty. Open source is a powerful tool, not a guarantee.
“European software is automatically more secure.”
Origin does not determine security quality. Assess secure development, vulnerability handling, certifications, transparency and track record. The Cyber Resilience Act raises the baseline for all products on the EU market, wherever they come from.20 The sovereignty argument concerns control and dependency, not inherent security.
“We are too small for technological sovereignty to matter.”
A small organisation will not change the market on its own, but many small decisions add up to the market. Dependency risk also affects small organisations directly: a price increase, a discontinued product or a cloud outage hits them hardest. Start with a few systems that matter, such as backup, email security or collaboration.
“Switching suppliers is too expensive.”
Switching can be expensive. That is exactly why exit costs should be considered before signing. Not every system needs to move. Prioritise new purchases, contract renewals and the most critical dependencies, and build exit options (data export, open standards) into every contract. EU rules on cloud switching are lowering some barriers.4
“For critical systems, only technical quality matters.”
For critical systems, technical quality is a precondition. But continuity is also a quality attribute: can you obtain updates, support and licences under every plausible scenario, including sanctions, export restrictions, acquisition or a supplier's withdrawal from the market? For critical systems, those risks deserve more weight, not less.